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British unemployment differs markedly from U.S. unemployment in two 
ways: (1) youth unemployment has been much lower relative to adult 
unemployment  for decades; and  (2) spells of  unemployment last on 
average about twice as long (at  a given point of  the cycle), with the 
difference being greater for adults. 
There  are also two points  of  similarity: (1) in  both  countries youth 
unemployment rises relative to adult unemployment in slumps; and (2) in 
both countries the demand for young workers is very sensitive to wage 
levels. I shall examine these phenomena in turn, devoting one section to 
each. 
Youth unemployment is relatively low in Britain, but why? It seems 
likely that both equilibrium and disequilibrium factors are involved (see 
section 15.1). An equilibrium approach to unemployment leads one to 
look mainly for supply-side factors which might  affect the choice of 
whether to be “unemployed”, rather than employed. I find good evi- 
dence that the higher relative youth unemployment in the U.S. reflects in 
part higher U.S. incomes, which also explain the remarkably low U.S. 
levels of  labor force participation  compared with Britain.  Supply be- 
havior is also influenced by price effects: income maintenance for adults 
is less generous in the U.S. than in Britain and this tends to reduce the 
relative unemployment of  adults. Another price effect in supply comes 
from the rigidity of the British labor market, which refuses admission to 
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apprenticeship programs to most people over the age of  sixteen; this 
provides a strong incentive for youths to be employed. 
I next explore whether differential disequilibrium can help to explain 
higher relative youth employment in the States. The obvious influence 
here is the minimum wage law, which does not exist in Britain. Though 
there is some noncompliance, it seems probable that the minimum wage 
has contributed to youth unemployment in the U.S. But the structure of 
age-wage profiles does not reveal any sharp differences between the 
countries. 
Finally, there is an important difference in information. Almost every 
school-leaver in Britain is interviewed by  the Careers Service before 
leaving school,  and nearly  a quarter find their first job through the 
Service. By contrast, in the U.S. the state plays little more role in the 
placement of  youths than in the placement of  adults. Unfortunately, I 
cannot say  how  important this factor is, nor could one estimate the 
influence of any of the factors that I document without analyzing data on 
many more countries. This should soon be feasible. 
The next issue is the efficiency cost of the unemployment in each age 
group, and the impact of  the unemployment upon the level of  social 
inequality. To do this one needs to look at duration (see section 15.2). If 
unemployment arises from disequilibrium job-rationing, its cost (relative 
to the gross output lost) is approximately proportional to the average 
duration of the uncompleted spells. Taking all age groups at a given point 
in the cycle, average durations are about twice as high in Britain as in the 
U.S. And the average number of  spells per year among those experi- 
encing any unemployment has been about the same. Thus, even though 
average levels of  unemployment have been higher in the U.S. than in 
Britain,  the efficiency cost  (relative  to  GNP)  has  been  lower.  Fur- 
thermore,  annual  unemployment  has  been  more  evenly  distributed 
across people. 
As between youths and adults, the higher relative rate of youth unem- 
ployment  in the U.S. turns out to be  mainly due to higher relative 
durations. Thus the share of youth unemployment in the total efficiency 
cost of unemployment may be higher in the U.S. On the other hand, the 
less generous scales of unemployment benefit may mean that adults suffer 
more when they are unemployed than youths do. Thus while the British 
worry particularly about youth unemployment (and now about long-term 
adult unemployment), the Americans may be right to worry particularly 
about adult male unemployment. The British experience, however, does 
suggest that a good case can be made for a Careers Service for youth. 
Feldstein argued some years ago that the U.S. should have such a service. 
Given the market failures that arise in the presence of  asymmetrical 
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A further issue is the time-series behavior of  youth unemployment 
rates (see section 15.3). In the late 1970s youth unemployment was much 
higher in Britain than ever before. This phenomenon has led to endless 
speculation about structural change. But in fact it is due almost entirely to 
cyclical factors. For in Britain,  as in  the U.S.,  the age structure of 
unemployment rates can be well explained by the state of  the cycle, by 
relative youth earnings, and by demographic factors. In the 1970s the size 
of  the youth cohort increased, as did relative youth earnings, so our 
equations tend, if  anything, to overpredict recent levels of youth unem- 
ployment. There is no clear evidence that Britian has moved permanently 
toward the American pattern of high relative youth unemployment rates. 
Across towns, the level of youth unemployment varies with the level of 
adult unemployment, in Britain as in America. The elasticity of  youth 
unemployment with respect to adult unemployment is much less in the 
cross-section (0.6) than in the time series (1.4). This is what I would 
expect since over time youths are particularly strongly affected by cyclical 
variations in rates of  hiring, and these cyclical effects are not present in 
the cross-section. American findings, however, do not in this respect 
mirror British experience.' 
Finally, in section 15.4, I confirm that it is reasonable to find wage 
effects on  youth unemployment by looking at the effect of wages on youth 
employment. I estimate the demand system derived from the trans-log 
cost function on time series data for British manufacturing (April and 
October 1949-69). Holding constant output and capital, the own-wage 
elasticity of  demand is around -  1.3  for youths, -  1.6 for women, and 
-0.3  for girls and men. These effects are broadly consistent with the 
American evidence. Thus, if  there must be minimum wages, the case for 
a separate youth rate seems overwhelming. 
15.1  Why Is Relative Youth Unemployment Higher in the U.S.? 
15.1.1  The Puzzle 
In the U.S., unemployment rates for young people are much higher 
relative to  rates for adults than they are in Britain. There are various ways 
of looking at this. A crude way is to examine the unemployment rate of, 
say, all those under 25 relative to the unemployment rate of  those over 
25. This comparison is made in table 15.1,  which is based on Census data 
since this is the source that is most truly comparable between the two 
countries, both in its questions and method of data collection.*  It does not 
matter that it is rather out of  date since I am mainly concerned with 
long-run differences between the countries. As the table shows, for males 
the rate for those under 25 is nearly twice as high (relative to the adult 502  Richard Layard 
Table 15.1  Age-specific Unemployment Rates for Nonstudents 
in Britain (1971) and U.S. (1970) 
Percentage 
Males  Females 
Britain  U.S.  Britain  U.S. 
Under 25  6.6  9.6  5.1  8.2 
25 +  3.6  2.8  3.2  4.1 
Total  4.2  3.6  3.7  4.9 
(Under 25 rate 
divided by 25+ rate)  (1.8)  (3.4)  (1.6)  (2.0) 
SOURCE  AND  NOTES:  See appendix A. 
rate) in the U.S. as in Britain.3  There is less difference for women, but still 
some. 
However, these differences could be misleading. For the U.S. labor 
force aged under 25 is much more recently out of school than the British 
labor force under 25; so one might expect that fewer of its members would 
have been absorbed into empl~yment.~  To deal with this problem one can 
compare the unemployment rates of  people with similar periods of ex- 
perience since leaving school. This comparison can be made in table 
15.2.5  For example, if  one wants to compare British youths with U.S. 
whites [US(  W)], one notes that a half of 16  year olds in Britain were out of 
school, as were a half of  19 year old U.S. whites, and in each case about 
one-third had left school in the last year. If we now compare the unem- 
ployment rates of  these groups for males, we  find they were 8.8% in 
Britain and 11.2% for U.S. whites. By contrast, the adult unemployment 
rates (for those aged 30-34)  were in the opposite order: 3.9% in Britain 
and only 2.6% for U.S. whites. 
For women, the difference in age profiles between Britain and the U.S. 
is less striking. This may be because the concept of  unemployment is 
more-slippery for adult women than for any other group. In any case, 
there are no comprehensive data on female unemployment in Britain 
except at Census years, so I shall henceforth confine my remarks to men. 
For unemployed men the regular data come from registrations at employ- 
ment offices, and these are quite comprehensive since most unemployed 
men register. The data show that at any point in the cycle the youth 
unemployment rates are lower relative to the adult rate than they are in 
the U.S. (see tables 15.3 and 15.4). 
In passing, one should note the profound implications of  this for the 
comparison of  aggregate unemployment rates between Britain and the 
U.S. The normal assertion is that the British rate of  registered unem- 
ployed needs to be raised by a fifth or less to allow for unregistered female 
unemployment and thus to get it onto a “survey basis” comparable with 503  Youth Unemployment in Britain and the United States 
the U.S. rate.6  This comparison always makes the U.S. rate look awfully 
high. For example, in 1976 the U.S. Bureau of  Labor Statistics estimate 
that British unemployment adjusted to U.S. concepts was 6.4% com- 
pared with the published British figure of  5.6% and the U.S. figure of 
7.7%. Thus the U.S. rate is still 1.3% higher. But at the same time the 
prime-age male rate (aged 25-54)  was about 0.8% lower in the U.S. than 
in Britain.’ In fact, it seems likely that in every year in the 1970s except 
1976 the U.S. prime-age male rate was below the British. It is therefore 
well to remember how much the aggregate U.S. rate is boosted not only 
by  the relatively high  rate of  female unemployment but  also by  the 
relatively high rate of  youth unemployment.R 
The question is why the youth rates should be so much higher (relative 
to adult rates) than in Britain. At least five possibilities come to mind. 
15.1.2  Income Effects in Labor Supply 
The U.S. is a richer society. To investigate the effects of income I shall 
begin by  looking at labor force participation. Participation rates are 
Table 15.2  Schooling, Labor Force Participation and Unemployment 
in Britain 11Wl)  and U.S. (1970) 
% of  population  % of  nonstudents  % of  nonstudents in 
who are  who are in  civilian labor force 
nonstudents  labor force  who are unemployed 
Age  Britain  US(W)  US(i3)  Britain  US(W)  US(i3)  Britain  US(W)  US(i3) 
12  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
Males 
(15)  (31.4)  (4.4)  (7.6)  (87.3)  (32.5)  (26.5)  (21.7)  (16.0)  (20.6) 
16  52.3  7.9  11.8  97.1  48.6  34.7  8.8  21.6  27.0 
17  71,O  13.3  20.5  97.9  65.3  48.0  6.7  19.0  27.1 
18  78.8  30.2  45.0  98.1  82.8  71.8  7.2  12.9  20.8 
19  83.6  48.2  61.6  98.0  86.4  71.8  7.1  11.2  18.6 
20  85.5  59.8  77.8  97.8  88.3  76.0  6.9  9.6  14.6 
25-29  98.2  89.5  93.3  98.3  95.6  87.3  4.2  3.3  6.0 
30-34  99.2  94.7  95.3  98.2  96.2  89.1  3.9  2.6  4.7 
21-24  92.8  75.8  87.5  98.2  92.4  82.1  5.4  6.4  10.4 
Females 
(15)  (31.7)  (5.0)  (8.4)  (87.0)  (19.5)  (16.7)  (14.9)  (15.9)  (25.4) 
16  52.0  8.5  13.1  94.1  26.5  20.7  6.8  21.9  33.0 
17  69.7  15.0  22.2  91.6  35.2  29.2  5.3  19.3  31.1 
18  79.6  38.9  46.9  86.5  59.6  44.4  5.0  11.7  24.4 
19  85.2  54.9  63.6  80.9  63.1  50.6  4.8  9.3  21.0 
20  87.2  67.6  79.5  74.4  62.4  55.3  4.5  7.8  15.9 
25-29  99.2  95.4  95.5  43.1  43.1  58.3  4.3  4.9  8.5 
30-34  99.4  96.6  96.3  44.8  41.8  59.1  4.2  4.6  7.0 
21-24  95.9  85.6  89.8  61.1  56.9  58.9  4.1  5.7  11.8 
SOURCE  AND NOTES:  See appendix A. 504  Richard Layard 
Table 15.3  Male Unemployment Rates for Nonstudents: By Age (1976) 
Britain  Britain  U.S. 
Age  (Jan.)  (July)  (Allyear) 
16-17  12.4  26.8  28.4 
18-19  11.1  10.6  17.3 
20-24  10.0  9.3  11.0 
25-34  6.6  6.2  6.2 
35-44  5.5  5.2  4.1 
45-54  4.6  4.5  .  4.0 
4‘9  ]  4.2 
5.2 
55-59  4.9 
65 +  60-64  ]  9.5  ]  9.5 
Total  6.9  7.3  7.0 
SOURCE:  Department of  Employment Gazette, January 1979,  p. 40. Employment and Train- 
ing Report of  the President, 1978, tables A3, A19 and B7. 
NOTES:  1. U.S. data include persons in school if  they were also in the labour force. 
2.  A fine age breakdown of youth unemployment is only available in the U.S. in October 
and in Britain quarterly (and till recently only in January and July). The first three U.S. 
figures relate to October, but other data show that for those aged 16-21 not in school the 
October rate is quite close to the annual average (Bureau of Labor Statistics,  Handbook of 
Labor Statistics  1977 p. 57). There is surprisingly little month to month variation in the 
unemployment rate for such people. In Britain the youth unemployment rate is much higher 
in June/July than at any other time. 
dramatically lower at all ages in the U.S. (except among the old). Table 
15.2, gives the figures for those under 35, and the same is true for all age 
groups under 65. Whereas virtually all British males who are not in- 
capacitated participate, the number of U.S. males not in the labor force is 
greater at every age than the number who are unemployed. (This has 
been true in most years, except for those aged 25-34  in a few recent 
years.) 
If  income accounts for this difference between the two countries, it 
should also have produced a decline in age-specific participation rates 
over time within the U.S., which we do indeed observe. It should also 
lead to lower participation rates in higher income groups, which we again 
observe for adults. But for youths, cross-sectional data may suggest the 
reverse   at tern.^ I believe that this can be explained by  the role  of 
job-rationing in the youth labor market. Suppose that family connections 
have an important effect on a teenager’s ability to find a job, and thus in 
turn on his willingness to participate. If family connections can be repre- 
sented by  income relative to the mean  (ylj)  then the probability of 
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If 1 >  I3 -  a  >  0, we should observe (1) that in a cross-section  high-income 
youths participated more than low-income youths and (2) that over time 
and across countries, participation fell as average income rose. 
Our main concern, however, is with the participation rate of  youths 
relative to adults. This is much lower in America than in Britain (where it 
is roughly equal).'" Can this be explained by income levels? It seems quite 
likely. For over time youth participation  rates (of  nonstudents)  have 
fallen by a greater proportion than adult participation rates." Thus it may 
Table 15.4  Unemployment Rates by Age 
Males  Females 
Britain  U.S.  Britain  U.S. 
Under  All  All  Under  All  All 
20 *  ages  18-19  ages  20*  ages  18-19  ages 
1959  1.6  2.2  15.1  5.3  0.8  1.5  13.1  5.9 
1960  1.0  1.7  16.5  5.4  0.6  1.2  13.0  5.9 
1961  0.8  1.5  15.2  6.4  0.5  1.0  14.5  7.2 
1962  1.7  2.1  13.0  5.2  1.1  1.3  12.3  6.2 
1963  1.9  2.6  14.8  5.2  1.4  1.5  14.9  6.5 
1964  1.3  1.8  13.3  4.6  0.8  1.1  15.3  6.2 
1965  1.1  1.6  10.4  4.0  0.7  0.9  13.7  5.5 
1966  1.2  1.7  8.4  3.2  0.7  0.8  12.6  4.8 
1967  2.6  2.8  10.7  3.1  1.3  1.1  16.1  5.2 
1968  2.6  3.1  9.5  2.9  1.2  1.0  12.9  4.8 
1969  2.7  3.1  8.9  2.8  1.1  0.9  11.0  4.7 
1970  3.4  3.4  14.1  4.4  1.4  1.0  16.4  5.9 
1971  5.4  4.5  14.6  5.3  2.4  1.3  16.7  6.9 
1972  6.8  4.9  11.9  4.9  3.1  1.5  15.2  6.6 
1973  3.3  3.5  9.9  4.1  2.0  1.1  13.8  6.0 
1974  3.6  3.5  15.3  4.8  2.0  1.0  16.9  6.7 
1975  7.4  5.2  18.6  7.9  5.3  1.9  19.0  9.3 
1976  9.1  6.7  17.3  7.0  8.0  3.0  18.5  8.6 
8.2  1977  9.6  7.0  -  6.2  9.4  3.8  - 
SOURCE:  British data kindly supplied by Peter Makeham of the Department  of  Employ- 
ment  from his forthcoming study of  youth  unemployment.  For  his basic findings see 
Department of Employment Gazette,  August 1978.  U.S.: Employment and Training Report 
of the President, 1978, tables B7 and A19. 
NOTES:  1.  *The British  youth  rates  relate  to July  but  exclude  from  the unemployed 
"unemployed  school-leavers" (i.e., people under 18 who have never had a full-time job). 
This is to eliminate variation due to changes in school-leaving dates and dates of  the 
unemployment count. If  school-leavers are included the youth figures are males: 1959,1.7; 
€975,9.8; females: 1959,l.O; 1975,7.4. Adult students are also excluded-there  were very 
few of  these till about 1975 when the National Union of  Students began encouraging 
students to claim benefit (they are now no longer able to claim). 
2.  If  British youth unemployment rates are measured in January (which is impossible for 
1974 and 1975), they have similar year to year movements to this series but with the ratio of 
July to January rising secularly as the employment situation worsens. 
3. U.S. rates are all-year rates. 506  Richard Layard 
Table 15.5  Average Hourly Earnings of Manual Workers within Each Age 
Group as Percentage of Average Hourly Earnings of  AU Manual 
Workers in the Same Column 1976-77 
Britain  U.S. 
Aee  Males  Females  Aee  Males  Females 
~~ 
Under 18  51  68 
18-20  76  90  16-19  56  74 
21-24  96  100  20-24  82  97 
NOTE:  U.S. data relate to workers paid at hourly rates (including part-timers and students) 
in May 1976. British data relate to full-time manual workers in April 1977. 
SOURCE:  Britain: Depahment of  Employment, New Earnings Survey 1977, pp. A18 and 
A19. U.S.: U.S. Department of  Labor, B.L.S. Weekly and Hourly Earnings Datafrom the 
Current Population Survey,  Special Labor Force Report 195, 1977, table 4. 
well be that higher income leads to disproportionate reduction in work- 
ing-time at the beginning of life. Otherwise it is difficult to explain why so 
many American parents are willing to support children who are not even 
looking for work.12  It  is hard to  imagine such a phenomenon occurring in a 
much poorer country. 
Turning to unemployment, we again find that the unemployment rate 
of  youths relative to adults has an upward trend in the U.S.I3 This is 
consistent with the notion that the U.S./British differences may be partly 
a function of the difference in income levels,I4  with leisure in youth being 
more luxurious than leisure in middle age. However, the story is much 
more complicated than this, and, while arguing that income effects are a 
part of  the story, I now turn to other possible explanations.l5 
15.1.3  Price Effects in Labor Supply: Social Security 
Does social security help to explain the lower relative unemployment 
of  adults in the U.S.? Quite possibly. For adults, the key variable is net 
income out of work relative to net income in work..This is much lower in 
the U.S. than in Britain. In Britain the average male replacement ratio is 
.75 for  all  those  currently  unemployed  and  .69  for  those  currently 
employed.I6  In the U.S. the best data I can find are Feldstein’s, which 
relate to individuals aged 25  to 55 excluding labor force entrants and 
reentrants.” Nearly all of these were entitled to UI, which would not be 
true of  many younger people nor  of  many  labor force entrants and 
reentrants. Yet even for the relatively “privileged” group the average 
replacement ratio was .59 for the unemployed and .55 for the population 
as a whole. Thus the U.S. system is less generous than the British system 
to the adult unemployed.IR 
But the U.S.  system is also of  course less generous to youths (see 
appendix B). However, for youths it is not the income replacement ratio 
that matters. What matters is the consumption “replacement ratio,” and, 
given the indulgence of  American parents, this may be quite high.Ig 507  Youth Unemployment in Britain and the United States 
Thus the lower adult income replacement ratios in the U.S. are prob- 
ably an important reason for relatively high youth unemployment rates. 
But it  is sometimes suggested that  in  addition  Aid  to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) claimed by the family head raises relative 
youth rates. The argument is this. In Britain a child not in school is 
treated as an independent economic unit, even if  living with the family. 
Thus the income received by  a single parent  mother with dependent 
children will be independent of the work behavior of the older child. The 
fact that she is subsidized will have an income effect on the youth’s 
behavior, but that is all. In the US., however, a single-parent mother on 
AFDC has her AFDC income reduced (at a two-thirds marginal tax rate) 
for any income earned by a child who contributes to the family expenses. 
This would set up a substitution effect against the child working as well as 
an income effect. Moreover, if  AFDC is lost because of excessive family 
earnings, the family also loses its Medicaid privileges. However, one 
would expect the mother would normally say the youth did not contribute 
to family expenses.*O In this case AFDC sets up a substitution effect in 
favor of  the child’s working, since the parent’s earnings are taxed, the 
child’s are not, and the child’s and parent’s leisure must be substitutes. 
In any cFse, the data show clearly that welfare is not a major part of the 
teenage unemployment story. For in families where the head is not on 
welfare the ratio of unemployment to employment is 97% of the overall 
ratio (including those on welfare); for blacks the comparable figure is 
88%.2’ I conclude that AFDC does not explain the high relative youth 
unemployment rate, but the lower level of  adult benefits may help to 
explain the low relative level of  U.S. adult unemployment. 
15.1.4  Price Effects in Labor Supply: 
Age Limits for Apprenticeship 
Labor supply is affected not only by the cost of being unemployed, but 
by  the returns to being employed. For many British teenagers these 
returns are very high. To become a skilled worker you will generally have 
to serve an apprenticeship, and most apprenticeships have to be entered 
at the age of 16. Thus the discounted cost of not getting a job at 16 can be 
quite high.  This helps to explain low unemployment  rates and high 
participation rates for young males. It does not apply to young women, 
few of whom become apprentices. This may explain why the U.S./British 
age profiles of unemployment differ more for men than for women (see 
table 15.1). 
In the more flexible U.S. situation, the youth market is less separated 
and less institutionalized than in Britain. It may be disadvantageous to be 
in a somewhat separated market in the face of business cycle variations in 
demand, but it may be an advantage to be separated when it comes to the 508  Richard Layard 
effect of  exogenous increases in youth wages. This brings me to the 
question of  the minimum wage. 
15.1.5  Price Effects in Labor Demand 
The U.S. has statutory minimum wages (identical for young and old) 
now covering most of  the labor force. Britain only has statutory mini- 
mums in a few industries (mainly retailing and catering), though most 
other wages are covered by collective bargaining, which may also intro- 
duce rigidities into the structure.22  However, in both statutory sectors and 
those covered by bargaining, youths and young women have special rates 
that are lower than those for adults. 
It is difficult to draw any conclusions about the effects of  minimum 
wages on relative youth unemployment by comparing the slope of British 
and American  age-wage profiles, since so  many cetera are not para. 
However, table 15.5 shows hourly earnings for manual workers of each 
age relative to the average for all ages. This does not suggest that on 
average American youths are relatively overpaid. As a further check, 
table 15.6 shows the average weekly earnings of  youths relative to the 
all-age average. The median age of U.S.  nonstudent workers aged under 
25 is about 22, and British workers with comparable work experience are 
aged about 19. Again, it does not seem that young U.S. workers have 
higher relative pay than young British workers.U 
But of  course there is always the problem that we never observe the 
wage that would have been paid to those who do not get employed. The 
same problem arises when we look at the relation between the distribu- 
tion of  youth wages and the minimum wage. According to Ashenfelter 
and Smith, in the covered sector the proportion of workers aged 17-19 
paid the federal minimum wage or less was only 8% in 1973 and 12% in 
Table 15.6  Average Weekly  Earnings within Each Age Group as Percentage of 
Average Weekly  Earnings of Workers of Au Ages in the Same 
Column 1976-77 
Britain  us. 
Age  Males  Females  Males  Females 
Under 18  42  58 
la20  63  78  59  80 
21-24  84  96  59  80 
25-29  98  116  89  104 
NOTE: U.S.  data relate to annual earnings of  year-round, full-time workers. British data 
relate to weekly earnings of  full-time employees in the survey week or month. 
SOURCE:  Britain: Department of  Employment, New Earnings Survey 1977,  pp. A18 and 
A19. U.S.: Department of Commerce, Bureau of  the Census, Current Population Repof?, 
Series P4  no. 114., Money Income in 1976 of Families and Persons in the U.S.  1978 pp. 
2034. 509  Youth Unemployment in Britain and the United States 
1975.= The proportion in the uncovered sector was about one-half in 
1973, but this sector was small. Thus the fraction of  employed workers 
who would have been paid less than the minimum wage is not enormous; 
and, in addition, for employed workers the minimum wage is not paid in 
about a third of such cases. However, against this we have not allowed for 
the possible employment effects of the minimum wage, which could have 
ejected many low wage workers from the population being observed. It is 
therefore interesting to compare the shape of the British and U.S. wage 
distribution for young people, to see whether the U.S. distribution looks 
as though it is missing its lower tail. For males, the lower quartile was 
about 80% of the median for both U.S. whites aged 1619  and for British 
youths aged under 18 and 18-20,25  providing no evidence of  a reduced 
lower tail in the U.S. Unfortunately, the published figures do not permit a 
similar calculation for U.S. blacks. Given the good time-series evidence 
for  the  effect  of  minimum  wages  on  youth  employment  and 
unemployment,26  I am inclined to conclude that minimum wages may 
contribute a little toward the higher rates of white youth unemploymeni 
in the U.S. and a lot to the higher still rates of  black youth unemploy- 
ment. 
15.1.6  Information: The British Careers Service 
Finally, we consider an important institutional feature of  the British 
youth labor market: the Careers Service. About 97% of  school-leavers 
register with the Careers Service.” Most of them are interviewed by a 
Careers Officer while they are in school and about a quarter get their first 
job through the Service. The state apparatus makes much more effort to 
find jobs for school-leavers than it does for adults.= 
The following shows the process by  which school-leavers find jobs. 
Each year over 650,000 youngsters leave school before the age of  18, 
most of them in June and July. The number who had still not found jobs is 
as follows (figures given in  thousand^):^^ 
1974  1975  1976  1977  1978 
September  33  118  142  166  131 
October  13  65  78  93  76 
November  8  40  n.k.  69  53 
December  n.k.  32  48  54  40 
----- 
Since the school-leaving age was raised to 16 (with effect from 1973), the 
vast majority of all school-leavers have been leaving at the age of 16. Yet 
the unemployment rate has been hardly any higher for people aged 16-17 
than for those aged  18-19  or 20-24  (see table 15.3). This suggests a 
relatively successful  initial absorption of school-leavers, but considerable 
problems arising after the first job is over. 510  Richard Layard 
15.2  Duration as an Indicator of  the Cost 
and Distribution of  Unemployment 
We have not so far compared the economic cost of unemployment in 
Britain and the U.S.  To assess the economic cost of  a given stock of 
unemployment  one needs to know how long it has lasted. The key 
statistic is the distribution of  those currently unemployed by the length of 
time they havs been unemployed to date (i.e., the distribution of “inter- 
rupted spells”). Since this is not universally agreed, I should perhaps first 
justify this focus on interrupted spells. 
It seems reasonable to suppose that the value of  additional leisure 
vanes with the amount of leisure already experienced. Thus if we want to 
cost the unemployment experienced in a particular week we look at the 
amount of  unemployment already experienced by the unemployed. If  a 
person could produce Wper week (gross) and values his tth week’s leisure 
at V,, then the economic cost of  the tth week of  unemployment is 
c,  = w -  v, 
Thus the total cost of unemployment per week is 
Ca 
I:  N,C,=N* X  -.C, 
t=l  ) 
where N, are the numbers with t weeks unemployment experience and 
N =  The significance of  a given stock of unemployment (N) thus 
depends on the distribution of  the interrupted durations (N,IN). 
This applies equally in a steady or a nonsteady state. However, for 
those who are naturally inclined to think of  unemployment in terms of 
flows, there is of  course an analogous expression which shows how in a 
steady state the significance  of a givenflow of unemployment (F)  depends 
on the distribution of  completed durations. Suppose F is the flow per 
period of entrants whose completed duration will be d periods, and Td is 
the total cost of  a completed spell lasting d weeks. Then the total cost per 
week in a steady state is 
where F =  ZFd. Most members of  the public, 
academics), have no idea what the flow into 
however (and even most 
unemployment is, and it 
seems much better to focus on the average cost of the-stock of unemploy- 
ment rather than of  the 
To measure this average cost it is probably sufficient to concentrate on 
the mean spell length, at any rate on the assumption that unemployment 
is involuntary. For then, in the case of  a person who has been unem- 
ployed so far for t weeks and who is normally paid his marginal 511  Youth Unemployment in Britain and the United States 
t 
52  E 
C,=W-V,=---W 
where E is the compensated elasticity of supply of annual weeks. The total 
cost relative to potential labor earnings is 
where u is the unemployment rate, Urelates to the unemployed, and Tto 
the total labor force. If duration and wages are independent, this reduces 
to 
Thus assuming the term in brackets to be similar in the U.S. and Britain, 
ui is a good index of  the cost of  unemployment relative to potential 
earnings.33 
This index is shown in table 15.7. Since duration in Britain is generally 
twice as large as in the U.S. (at a similar point in the cycle), the relative 
cost is higher even though the rates are generally lower. This is why 
people in Britain tend to worry more about unemployment. 
Another possible reason for being interested in the mean uncompleted 
duration is that it is also equal to the mean time that those currently 
unemployed will remain unemployed from now on.%  The length of  the 
uncompleted  duration may thus give some idea of  the plausibility of 
viewing workers as engaged in search rather than (as we have hitherto 
assumed) as being rationed. There certainly appears to be more search 
unemployment in the U.S. than in Britain. 
Of  course, if a given stock of unemployment is associated with a longer 
duration, this means not only that it is more costly but also that it is more 
unequally distributed. Fewer people will be experiencing more unem- 
ployment (if we ignore for the time being the problem of repeated spells). 
Table 15.8  gives some relevant figures for all age groups combined.35  We 
find for 1972-77  an average male completed duration of about 7 weeks in 
the U.S.  and 13 weeks in Britain, with corresponding differences in 
probability of an individual’s becoming unemployed. These differences 
are consistent with the picture of  a more mobile society in which all 
durations are shorter (job tenure, housing tenure, marital tenure). For 
example, the monthly turnover rate in manufacturing in 1977 was 3.8 in 
the U.S. and 2.1 in Britain.%  However, in addition the shorter duration 
may be due to  the fact that UI normally expires after some months. Public 
assistance may then be available at a much lower rate. In Britain, social 
security is in effect paid indefinitely, though at a lower rate after the first 
26 weeks and a slightly lower average rate after a year. 512  Richard Layard 
Table 15.7  Average Uncompleted Duration of Male Unemployment, and the 
Approximate Cost of Male Unemployment Relative to Potentid 
Male Earnings 
Approximate cost of 
unemployment relative 
Average uncompleted  Unemployment  to potential male 
duration (weeks)  rate (%)  earnings (index) 
Britain (July)  1  2  3 [= (2)  x  (111 
1971  23.4  4.5  105 
1972  27.8  4.9  136 
1973  30.8  3.5  107 
1974  26.4  3.5  92 
1975  22.3  5.2  116 
1976  26.5  6.7  177 
1977  28.1  7.0  1% 
1978  29.5  6.7  197 
U.S.  (All year) 
1971  11.3  5.3  60 
1972  12.0  4.9  59 
1973  10.0  4.1  41 
1974  9.7  4.8  46 
1975  14.1  7.9  112 
1976  15.8  7.0  110 
1977  14.3 
SOURCE:  Britain: Department of  Employment Gazette, September 1978,  p. 1049 and table 
15.4of thischapter. U.S.: G.  Akerlof and B. Main, “Unemployment Spells andunemploy- 
ment Experience,” Federal Reserve Board, Washington, D.C., Special Studies Paper no. 
123, October 1978, and table 15.4 of  this chapter. 
NOTE: U.S.  data assume duration to be the same for men as for men and women. This 
slightly understates duration (see table 15.12). 
This reminds us that duration, though it may be the main determinant 
of the efficiency cost of a given unemployment rate, is not the only thing 
affecting the distributional consequences of  unemployment. The social 
security system is probably more important. In the U.S.,  income out of 
work  is  lower relative  to income in  work  than in  Britain.  Thus the 
disequalizing effect of  unemployment is probably at least as high in the 
U.S.  as in Britain. But it is relatively greater for adults than for youths, so 
far as consumption is concerned. Thus it is not obvious in the U.S. that 
there is any greater equity case for measures to relieve youth unemploy- 
ment than adult unemployment. In fact, it is possible that the relative 
absence of  measures to combat youth unemployment in the U.S.,  com- 
pared with Europe, can be explained by the comparatively low levels of 
income maintenance for adults in the U.S. 
There is one obvious qualification, however, to be made to all of the 
preceding: the problem of  repeated spells. If  leisure in every week of 
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efficiency cost of unemployment would depend on the amount of  unem- 
ployment that each individual had had so far over his whole life. And the 
fairness with which unemployment was distributed would depend on the 
distribution of  lifetime unemployment. But leisure in more closely adja- 
cent weeks is in fact more closely substitutable than leisure in weeks more 
widely separated. So we could think of the efficiency  cost as depending on 
the distribution of unemployment accumulated over a year, and equity 
also as depending on the distribution of  annual unemployment. A key 
statistic is therefore the amount of repetition. Are the short U.S. dura- 
tions associated with more repetition? Apparently not. Unfortunately, 
the only British data are available for  1971-72  (the highest postwar 
unemployment year before the oil price rise). In that year the average 
number of spells per unemployed person was 1.8-almost  the same as in 
the U.S. in 1975, 1976 and 1977 (see table 15.9). 
Finally, we can return to the basic question of  section 15.1 and ask 
whether the higher U.S. youth unemployment (relative to adults) is due 
to higher relative flow or to higher relative duration. In table 15.10 the 
British duration figures (for January) overstate the relative duration of 
teenagers on an  all-year basis (see  table  15.11). It follows that  the 
Table 15.8  Completed Duration of Unemployment (Weeks, Males) 
Probability of 
entering 
Average completed  unemployment  Unemployment 
duration (Weeks)  (% per week)  rate (%) 
Britain  1  2  3 
1972  13 
1973  10 
1974  9 
1975  14 
1976  16 
1977  17 
U.S. 
1972  6.2 
1973  7.0 
1974  5.6 
1975  9.1 
1976  8.0 


























SOURCE:  Col. 1: 1. U.S. data from Akerlof and Main, (see table 15.8). They are got by 
applying the Salant method to the uncompleted durations. 2. The British data come from 
inflow data divided by stock data. Department of  Employment Gazette, September 1978. 
They relate only to registered unemployment-most  male unemployment is registered. 
Col 3: Sources are Employment and Training Report of  the President and Department of 
Employment Gazette. 
Col 2:  col. 3 divided by col. 1. 514  Richard Layard 
Table 15.9  Mstribution of Males Unemployed Sometime during 
a Twelve-month Period by Number  of Spells 
Average 
number 
1  2  3  4-9  10+  All  of  sDells 
Britain June71-72  66  20  7  5  2  100  1.8  - 
U.S. Jan. 75-76  64  18  18  100  1.63 
Jan. 76-77  61  19  20  100  1.67 
Jan. 77-78  62  20  18  100  1.66 
SOURCE:  Britain: DHSS study of claimants cited in D. Metcalf and S.  Nickell, “The Plain 
Man’s Guide to the Out of Work” in Selected Evidence submitted to the Royal Commission 
for Report no. 6, Lower Incomes, London, HMSO, pp. 310-29.  The data are derived from 
social security records. Retrospective questions from the General Household Survey in 
1975,1976, and 1977 suggest fewer repeated spells for men aged 18-64 but the retrospective 
nature of  the question casts doubt on the replies. For the record the results were (for men 
aged 18-64) 
1  2  3+  All 
1975  85  10  5  100 
1976  87  9  3  100 
1977  83  13  3  100 
See Office of Population Censuses and Surveys, Genen 







Yousehold Survey, 1977, -ondon, 
US.:  Bureau of  Labor Statistics, Work Experience ofthe Population, Special Tabulations. 
Data exclude students. The average figure is based on the assumption that average spells in 
the 3 + category are 3.5, as normally assumed by the Bureau of  Labor Statistics. 
durations of youths in the U.S. are definitely higher relative to  adults than 
they are in Britain. And indeed, for people aged 20-24  differences of 
duration alone seem to explain the higher relative unemployment rate.37 
For teenagers there is in addition a disproportionately high inflow into 
unemployment in the U.S.,  but this must be largely due to the high 
proportion of  teenagers who have recently left s~hool.’~ 
15.3  British Time-series and Cross-section Analysis 
of  Youth Unemployment3’ 
In Britian youth unemployment has risen much more sharply relative 
to adult unemployment than in the U.S. Present ratios of  youth to adult 
unemployment are totally without postwar precedent. But so is the level 
of  adult unemployment (see table 15.4 and figure 15.1).@  By contrast, in 
the U.S. recent high levels of  unemployment are less without precedent 
and have proved shorter-lived. However, it seems that similar mecha- 
nisms explain the time series (and cross-sectional) variation of  youth 515  Youth Unemployment in Britain and the United States 
unemployment in the two countries. Other things being equal, one would 
expect the youth unemployment rates to reflect (1) disequilibrium forces 
and (2) equilibrium forces, of  the kinds discussed in section 15.1. Dis- 
equilibrium corresponds to the difference between effective supply and 
demand. One  would expect that the demand for each type of labor would 
depend on output and on relative wages. Short-run changes in labor 
demand would not necessarily be proportional to changes in output. In 
fact, one would expect the demand for youths to be more responsive to 
the business cycle than the demand for adults, for two reasons. First, the 
simplest adjustment to a change in labor demand is to stop hiring, and 
hirings include a disproportionate number of youths. Second, the wages 
of youths include a higher fraction of  capital expenditure than the wages 
of adults, and firms are averse to capital expenditure during slumps. Thus 
one could write the demand for youths relative to adults as 
DY 
DA 
-  =  f( CYC, WYI 
where CYC  indicates the cycle and WYI WA  the wage of youths relative 
to adults. Building on this, one could approximate the unemployment 
rate of  teenagers relative to adults (nonteenagers) by 
Table 15.10  Age Specific Indices (Male, Nonstudents; All Ages = 1.0) 
Probability of 
entering 
Average completed  unemployment  Unemployment 
Britain  duration (weeks)  (% per week)  rate (%) 
(Jan. 1978)  1  2  3 
1617  0.53  3.38  1.79 
18-19  0.70  2.11  1.48 
20-24  0.80  1.71  1.37 
U.S. (1976) 
All ages  1.00  1.00  1.00 
1617  0.75*  5.41  4.06 
18-19  0.75*  3.29  2.47 
20-24  1.06  1.48  1.57 
All ages  1.00  1  .OO  1.00 
SOURCE:  U.S.:  Col. 1: K. Clark and L. Summers, “Labor Force Transitions and Unemploy- 
ment,” table 3. They get very similar results for 1974-and  also for 1968-76  in chapter 7 of 
this volume, table 7.3. 
Col. 3: Employment and Training Report of  the President, 1977. 
Col. 2: col 3 divided by col. 1. 
Britain: Col. 1: col. 3 divided by col. 2. 
Col. 2: Department of  Employment Gazette, February 1978, p. 205. 
Col 3: Department of  Employment Gazette, March 1979, p. 262. 
NOTE: *Separate figures not available. 516  Richard Layard 
Table 15.11  Uncompleted Duration of Unemployment (Weeks) 
Percentage unemployed 
over 13 weeks 
(Britain) 15 weeks (U.S.)  Mean duration 
Britain  us.  Britain  U.S. 
Jan.  July  Jan.  July  Jan.  July  Jan.  July 
1976  1976  1976  1976  1976  1976  1976  1976 
Males 
41  11  Under 18 
18-19  16.6  18.0 
2C-24  19.5  22.5  14.9  10.0  48  51  30  29 
All ages  25.4  26.5  15.9  12.3  56  54  32  29 
42  13'6  6'9  ]  10.3  6.0  44 
~ 
Females 
10  41  7'1  ]  9.5  6.1  4o  Under 18  13.1 
18-19  15.2  16.1 
20-24  16.1  18.1  10.9  8.1  42  45  20  16 
l2 I  2o  10  40 




Males  6.7  6.2 
Females  3.0  8.2 
SOURCE:  Department of  Employment, British Labour Statistics Year  Book, 1976,  table 113. 
Bureau of  Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings, July 1978, p. 32, and Handbook of 
Labor Statistics, 1977. 
NOTES:  1. The British data relate to period registered at exchange; U.S. data relate to 
reported period looking for work. 
2.  U.S. data include students but other data suggest that, holding age constant, duration of 
students and nonstudents are similar. 
(3)  = ao+ al CYC+a, In 
where SY/SA  are the relative labor ~upplies.~' 
In addition, equilibrium forces should be at work. Relative income 
support levels for the two groups should be important, but the Supple- 
mentary Benefit for a youth relative to an adult rarely had a t-value above 
unity. Equation (3) is therefore our estimating equation. The analysis is 
confined to males, since the rate of  registered unemployment of  adult 
females is particularly difficult to interpret. 
Before presenting the results, we discuss briefly the explanatory vari- 
ables and their movement over time. 
15.3.1  The Cycle (VAC or UA) 
This is probably best measured by the number of vacancies registered 
at employment offices (VAC).  Alternatively, it can be measured by the 517  Youth Unemployment in Britain and the United States 
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Fig. 15.1  Unemployment Rates of  Males Aged under 20  (Excluding 
School  Leavers)  and  All  Males,  1959-76,  July,  Britain 
(Source: Department of  Employment Gazette, August 1978) 518  Richard Layard 
adult male unemployment rate (UA), but we are then explaining youth 
unemployment by adult unemployment, which is a highly trended vari- 
able whose significance has probably altered over time. Vacancies are 
relatively untrended but have almost indentical turning points to adult 
unemployment (up to 1976). 
15.3.2  Relative Wage Rates (RYIRA) 
The hourly earnings of  men under 21 relative to those over 21 are 
shown in figure 15.2. Relative youth earnings rose steadily up until 1972. 
Then in 1973 they shot up and have continued shooting up since. The 
main explanation seems fairly clear. The compulsory minimum school- 
leaving age was raised from 15 to 16 for everyone becoming 15 after 
September 1972. About a half of all children were forced to stay an extra 
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Fig.  15.2  Average Hourly Earnings of Youths and Boys Aged Under 21 
as  a Percentage of  Adult Male  Hourly  Earnings  1948-76, 
Manual Workers, All Industries, Britain (Source: Department 
of  Employment  Gazette, October Earnings Survey) 519  Youth Unemployment in Britain and the United States 
1959  1976 
Fig. 15.3  Males Aged  15-19  as a Percentage of  Males Aged  15-60, 
Britain (Source: Estimates Supplied by  the Department of 
Employment) 
workforce, but is unlikely to have raised its quality by more than 5% 
compared with the 16% wage increase that occured after 1972.42 
So it is unclear why teenage earnings rose. If  the earnings rise was due 
to changes in the balance of  supply and demand, then one could hardly 
use it to explain movements in unemployment. This, however, does not 
seem to be the case. Let us begin with the period since 1972. Because of 
the raising of  the school-leaving age there would of  course have been a 
reduction in the number of  teenage ergs at work (relative to adults) of 
perhaps 10%. However, as figure 15.3 shows, the teenage population 
rose between 1972 and 1976 by 10%-just  enough by that date to offset 
the effect of  the raised school-leaving age. And in any case a raised 
school-leaving age would not create much marked shortage of youths at 
existing wages if people in their early twenties were good substitutes for 
teenagers. So I am willing to accept the conventional view that youth 520  Richard Layard 
wages have risen because of  an unexplained tendency in collectively 
bargained wage agreements to start paying adult rates at ever younger 
ages.43 
There is also the puzzle of  the rise in relative youth earnings before 
1972. Could this be due to quality improvement? During the period, the 
proportion of youngsters who stayed on rose continuously. This staying- 
on, if  independent of ability levels, would raise quality whether the extra 
staying-on  was  voluntary  or  compulsory.  However,  the  voluntary 
staying-on was in fact selective. So  the average “natural ability” of  the 
teenage work force declined as the abler people reduced the fraction of 
their teenage years spent in the labor force more rapidly than the less able 
people did. One cannot quantify this effect, but there seems no obvious 
reason to reject the null hypothesis that the quality of  the teenage work 
force remained constant relative to the adult work force (which was itself 
improving in quality). Thus one would expect the series in figure 15.2 
(including the dotted section) to help to explain relative teenage unem- 
ployment. Further confirmation of  the power of  this series to explain 
teenage employment is provided in section 15.4. 
15.3.3  Relative Labor Supply (POPYIPUPA) 
There are two possible ways of  measuring demographic movements: 
(1) the fraction of  the total population aged 15-60 who are aged 15-19 
(POPYIPUPA),  shown in figure 15.3; (2) the fraction of the total labor 
force aged 15-19.M The second of these appears to reflect more accurately 
the labor supply of  teenagers, but is subject to two drawbacks. First, if 
teenage labor supply is reduced (for example by the raising of the school- 
leaving age) one would not necessarily expect less teenage unemploy- 
ment if  people in their early twenties are close substitutes for teenagers. 
In fact the youth labor market may be better considered as a market for 
people in their first five years of work experience. In such a case variable 
(1) is more relevant.45  Second, labor supply may respond to unemploy- 
ment, whereas population is exogenous. I therefore use variable (1). 
One must of  course remember that over time the teenage labor force 
(whose unemployment we are studying) has got increasingly close to the 
time when it left school. This means that its members have had less time 
for a successful job-search and job-matching. One might suppose this 
would have produced an upward trend in relative youth unemployment, 
but no such trend appears in the regressions. However, as table 15.3 
shows, the youth unemployment problem is not primarily one of  initial 
absorption, so  this may not be an especially important aspect of  the 
situation. 
Turning to the results, these are estimated on annual data (males only). 
As table 15.12 shows, the effect of  the cycle is transparent. The youth 
unemployment rate goes up relative to the adult unemployment rate 521  Youth Unemployment in Britain and the United States 
Table 15.12  Time-series  Regressions (AU  Variables in Logarithms), Britain 
POPYI 
Dep.Var.  Period  VAC  UA  WYIWA  POPA  Const.  RZ  DW  SE 
UYIUA  59-72  -.54  4.62  1.29  -18.7  .96  2.63  ,048 
(W  (S2)  (.40) 
(45)  (.43)  (.40) 
(.41)  (.43) 
UYIUA  59-74  -.50  5.01  1.43  -20.7  .96  2.55  .046 
UYIUA  59-76  -.38  4.07  .42  -15.1  .93  1.49  .071 
UYIUA  59-72  .40  1.52  1.64  -10.1  .94  2.11  .om 
(.06)  (.88)  (S2) 
UYI UA  59-74  .43  .60  1.46  - 6.5  .91  1.88  .066 
(.06)  (.70)  (S3) 
(.07)  (.69)  (.40) 
NOTE:  Standard errors in brackets. All  regressions estimated by  Cochrane-Orcutt pro- 
cedure; the Hildreth-Liu procedure gave very similar results. 
UYIUA  59-76  .38  .71  .96  - 5.7  .93  1.90  .073 
during a slump. In fact, it rises 40% faster than the adult unemployment. 
Given that the youth unemployment rate is on average over the period 
close to the adult rate, it follows that youth employment falls in a slump 
faster than adult employment falls. The estimated effect is robust with 
respect to the other included variables, but falls as the sample period is 
extended forwards. This is because youth unemployment in 1976 was 
much lower than predicted by  any equation. Since all our exploratory 
variables have high values in  1976, their estimated coefficients all fall 
when that year is included. 
The estimated effect of relative wages seems to vary in addition accord- 
ing to how demand is specified, though it is always positive and reason- 
ably significant. If, as I prefer, demand is measured by vacancies, the 
effect of  relative wages is very large-with  an elasticity of  45.  In this 
case, relative wages are being made to explain most of the time trend in 
UY/  UA.  If, instead, adult unemployment is the explanatory variable, 
then it itself picks up a part of the time trend in UY/ UA. By contrast, the 
effect of  population size is  unaffected  by  which  demand  variable  is 
included. 
One can therefore conclude that there is nothing surprising about 
recent high levels of  youth unemployment. The world is still the same, 
except that we are in a protracted slump. 
15.3.4  Cross-section of  Towns 
It is interesting to compare the time-series relation between youth and 
adult unemployment with the cross-sectional relation. In a cross-section 
of  towns, one would expect the youth unemployment rate to vary posi- 522  Richard Layard 
tively with the adult unemployment rate. But one would also expect the 
elasticity of the youth rate with respect to the adult rate to be lower in the 
cross-section than in the time-series. For over time youths are not hired in 
a downturn, whereas in a “steady state’’ it is not obvious that a bad 
economic climate would affect youths more than adults. Indeed, since 
youths can more readily migrate, one might expect the youth rates (for 
the current work force) to vary less than the adult rate. One cannot of 
course claim that the 1971 data for 78 county boroughs (towns) repre- 
sented a completely “steady state,” however defined. Even so, the cross- 
sectional structure of  unemployment rates has been fairly stable. 
The data support our prediction:  the cross-section elasticity of  the 
youth rate with respect to the adult rate is only .6, compared with 1.4 for 
the time-series. The exact estimate is (s.e. in parentheses) 
In  UY  = 1.19 + .61 In  UA  R2 = 0.61 
(  - 06) 
where youths are teenage men as before and adults are men aged 25-59. 
Adding as a variable the relative supply of youths does not appear to add 
significantly to the explanatory power of  the equation. 
15.4  Time-series Analysis of the Demand for Labor 
by Age in British Manufacturing 
Finally, we can examine whether wage movements are a plausible 
explanation of  relative unemployment rates by looking at the effect of 
relative wages on the age composition of employment (rather than unem- 
ployment). The only available data on labor demand by age in Britain 
relate to manual workers in manufacturing, which I take to be a price- 
taking sector. I use data for April and October in the years 1949-69, on 
the man-hours of  youths (males under 21), girls (females under 18), men, 
full-time women, and part-time women, together with associated hourly 
earnings. 
The series are worth a brief description. Taking youths first, there was 
an increase  in employment  (relative to men) lasting into the 1960s, 
followed by a relative decline that began well before the raising of  the 
school-leaving age in 1972. By contrast, the relative wage rose more or 
less continuously relative to men, as we have already seen. The number 
of girls employed (again relative to men) fell more or less continuously, 
indicating that the rise in the number of boys in the mid-sixties  cannot be 
simply explained by the rise in the number of young people in the labor 
force resulting from the postwar baby boom. The relative wage of  girls 
was more or less flat until it surged in the 1970s because of  the forces 
already mentioned plus equal pay legislation for females. The relative 
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in part-time women-hours insufficient to compensate for the fall in full- 
time women-hours. Relative wages of women were more or less flat until 
a recent spurt, which was due partly to equal pay legislation. 
To  assess the effect of wages on labor demand requires a fully specified 
demand system. The most tractable general system is that derived from 
the translog cost function. In using this I shall not attempt to explain the 
pattern  of  investment  and will  therefore  take the capital stock as a 
predetermined variable (K)  affecting labour costs (C). If Pi is the price of 
the i*  type of labour, Tis  time, and Y is output, the cost function is then 
In c =  Uo  Xgi hl Pi f  gKhK + gTT  gyhY 
+ '/zZXd, In Pi In Pi + ?!2dKK  (lnK)2 
+ '/zdrrT2 + %dm  (lnY)z + EdiK  In Pi 1nK 
+ EdiT  In  Pi. T + EdiY  In  Pi 1nY 
+ dKT  1nK. T + dKy 1nK 1nY + dTy TlnY 
where d, = dji (assuming the function is thought of  as a Taylor's series 
expansion of  a general log-cost function). 
If  xi is the quantity of the ith type of  labor, 
alnC -  xiPi 
-=xi,  so that 
api  alnP,  C 
ac 
or the share of the ith  factor in total labour cost (C).  Hence differentiating 
1nC by lnPi we find that 
Xipi  --  -  gj  + 7 d,  In Pi  + diK In  K + diTT + diYln Y 
I 
. . . (i=l,.  . . ,n)  C 
(4) 
Since shares do not vary when all prices change by a common multiple, 
3 dij = 0  (all i) 
I  (5) 
Hence".  47 
n-1 
--  -  gi + ,X dij (In Pi -  In  P,)  + diK In  K  C  J=1  (4') 
+diTT+diyInY  (i=I,.  . . ,n) 
where n  is some factor taken as numeraire. Moreover, since shares add to 
a constant (unity), 
(6)  diK =  diT = 3 diy = 0 
1  I 
Hence one need only estimate (n -  1) equations for (n  -  1) shares. This 
is our estimating system, with the requirement that dij  = dji  imposed upon 
it. The Allen elasticities of  substitution are then evaluated asM 524  Richard Layard 
dii  1 
Ai  Ai 
sii =  + 1 - - 
s..  = -+  d,  1  (ifj) 
AiAi 
where Ai  =  xiPi/C  evaluated at the mean. The price elasticities of  de- 
mand (with output and capital constant) are 
e..  =  S.. A. 
ZI  4  I 
15.4.1  Estimates 
System (4') was estimated using the TSPs iterative version of  Zellner's 
minimum distance estimator (LSQ) (see table 15.13).49  The variables are 
defined in appendix C. Unfortunately, we have no data on nonmanual 
workers,  so  the  assumption  is  that  the relative  demand  for manual 
workers of  different age and sex is independent of  the number of  non- 
manual workers. Part-time women were amalgamated with full-timers in 
order to reduce the number of  parameters.% 
The results suggest a quite high short-run elasticity of  demand for 
youths (1.25), and a smaller elasticity of demand for girls. There is quite 
high substitutability between categories of  labor (except, rather oddly, 
between girls and women). Girls are very good substitutes for youths, 
and women are less good substitutes. As one would expect, youths and 
Table 15.13  Demand Elasticities and Elasticities of Substitution, Britain 
Youths  Girls  Women  Men 
eij  Youths  -  1.25  .29  .50  .47 
Girls  .82  -.31  -.85  .34 
Women  .12  -.07  -1.59  1.55 
Men  .02  .01  .32  -.35 
Sij  Youths  -33.6  22.1  3.1  .6 
Girls  22.1  -23.5  -5.3  .4 
Women  3.1  -5.3  -9.9  2.0 
Men  .6  .4  2.0  -  .4 
f-ratio  Youths  5.8  2.5  1.8  1.3 
Girls  2.5  .9  2.0  .7 
Women  1.8  2.0  10.5  9.5 
Men  1.3  .7  9.5  9.2 
NOTE: 1. The elasticities are for given capital and output. The f-ratios apply equally to eij 
and sii. 
2.  In the equations for Ay,  AG  and Aw  the implied values of DW and R2 were as follows: 
AY  AG  AW 
RZ  .96  .92  .92 
DW  1.11  1.87  .90 525  Youth Unemployment in Britain and the United States 
girls are not good substitutes for men, women being rather better substi- 
tutes.  None  of  the  effects  of  capital,  output,  or  time  were  well- 
determined. 
It is interesting to compare these findings with results obtained in the 
U.S. by Anderson and by F~eeman.~'  Anderson used four factors in a 
translog production function for manufacturing: capital, and workers 
aged under 25  (Y), 25-55  (M), and over 55 (0).  The implied price 
elasticities (with capital variable) were 
Y  M  0 
Y  -  2.5  1.9  .6 
M  .3  -  1.0  .4 
0  .3  1.7  -2.7 
Freeman used four factors in a translog production function for the whole 
economy: capital, men 2&34  (Y), men 35-64 (M) and women 20-64 (W). 
The implied price elasticities (with capital variable) were 
Y  M  W 
Y  -2.1  1.6  .2 
M  .8  -  1.2  .3 
W  .3  .9  -  1.3 
Though the U.S.  elasticities seem somewhat higher, any difference is 
probably due mainly to  the fact that capital is variable and that definitions 
differ. Given the weight of  evidence on price effects, one has some 
confidence in supposing that youth wages are highly relevant  to the 
problem of youth unemployment.52 
Appendix A 
Sources to Tables 15.1 and 15.2 
SOURCE:  Britain: 1971 Census, Economic Activity, table 3. 
U.S.: U.S. Department of  Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 
1970 Census of  Population, Detailed Characteristics, Fi- 
nal Report, PC(l)-Dl, U.S. Summary, table 217. 
NOTES:  1. Britain relates to 24 April 1971; U.S. relates to 1 April 1970. 
U.S. (W) relates to whites and U.S. (B) to blacks. 
2. Nonstudents in Britain include part-time students; in the U.S. 
they do not.  In Britain  a student is someone who will  be 
studying in the following ApriYMay term; in the U.S. a stu- 
dent is someone who has studied at all since 1 February. 526  Richard Layard 
3. The labor force is the employed (defined identically) plus the 
unemployed. The employed labor force includes those who 
worked at any time for pay or  profit during the week (including 
unpaid family work) plus those temporarily away from their 
job because  of  holiday,  sickness, or industrial dispute.  In 
Britain,  unlike  the U.S.,  temporary layoffs are treated  as 
employed,  but the maximum number of  such people since 
1973 has been 34,000 and the usual number is under 10,000. 
4.  In Britain, the unemployed include those persons currently 
“seeking work or waiting to take up a job.” In the U.S. ,  the 
unemployed include all who have looked for work in the last 4 
weeks or due to take up a job within a month, or on temporary 
layoff. The unemployed include those looking for part-time 
work, in both countries. 
Appendix B 
Income Maintenance for Young People 
Income if  unemployed as a fraction of  income in full-time work is 
probably higher for youths relative to adults in Britain than in the U.S. A 
registered unemployed British youth, even if he or she has never worked 
and is living at home, can claim Supplementary Benefit. This is currently 
paid to someone living at home and aged 16 to 17 at a rate equal to about 
30% of  gross male weekly earnings at that age (and a higher percentage of 
net earnings). With a minimal work record an 18 or 19 year old can claim 
unemployment benefit equal to about 30% of  the equivalent gross male 
earnings. About two-thirds of  unemployed youths under 18 in Britain 
personally receive social security payments  .53 
In the U.S. it is more difficult for a youth to obtain benefit in his own 
right. Only 11% of  those unemployed under twenty (out of  school and 
looking for full-time work) were on U.I. in May 1976. In some states 
other youths would be receiving personal welfare payments, but there is 
no comprehensive information on the numbers. 
Appendix C 
Definitions of Variables in Section 15.4 
P  Hourly earnings: from survey of  Earnings and Hours of  Manual 
Workers in  Manufacturing in April and October (to 1969) and 
October (1970 onwards). 527  Youth Unemployment in Britain and the United States 
X 
K 
Manual manhours: from the same source. 
Fixed assets in manufacturing. Gross value at constant prices (re- 
placement cost). The series is rebased a number of times over the 
period and I have grafted one series onto the next. 
Time (1 unit = 6 months; April 1948 = 1). 




1.  See Richard B. Freeman in this volume, table 5.6. 
2. The General Household Survey is too small for disaggregated comparisons with the 
Current Population Survey; the EEC Labour Force Survey only occurs every two or three 
years. 
3. The Census excludes full-time students in Britain, so students (including part-time 
students) have been excluded in the U.S. However, the age-specific  unemployment rates of 
students in the U.S. are broadly similar to those of  nonstudents. 
4.  A commonly used statistic in international comparisons is  the percentage of  the 
unemployed aged under 25. This is, however, very difficult to interpret since it reflects both 
the age pattern of leaving school and the demographic  structure of  the population, as well as 
the unemployment rates specific to given years since leaving school. The figures are: 
-  Men  Women 
Britain  USA.  Britain  USA. 
(1971)  (1970)  (1971)  (1970) 
% of  unemployed aged under 25*  31  30  34  31 
% of  labor force aged under 25’  20  11  25  19 
% of  population aged 16-64  who 
are aged under 25  22  27  21  26 
*Excluding  students 
5. One should ignore the figure for unemployed 15 year olds in Britain, since nearly all 15 
year olds in the labor force had left school a month before the Census. 
6.  See U.S., Department of  Labor, Bureau of  Labor Statistics, International Compari- 
sons of  Unemployment, Bulletin 1979, 1978, p. 19. 
7. A formula which would adjust the British aggregate rate so that in  1976 British 
aggregate adjusted rate -  U.S.  aggregate  rate = British prime male rate -  U.S.  prime male 
rate would be to multiply the British aggregate rate by 1.5. The multiple would of  course 
differ between years. 
8. It is also “boosted” by  the inclusion of  unemployed students (some 14% of  U.S. 
unemployed). Such people cannot be included when other countries are adjusted to U.S. 
concepts because of  lack of  data (and the absence of  any large number of  such people). 
Including them raises the U.S. rate by  a multiple of  between 1.05 and 1.10. 
9.  At any rate this is the broad effect of family income on employment reported in table 
5.8 of Freeman’s chapter in this volume and table 13.1  of  the chapter by  Rees and Gray. 
(Rees and  Gray also report  no effect of  father’s occupation holding constant family 
income.) 
10. In addition in 1970/1 of  employed males under 20 not in  school 21% in the U.S. 
worked part-time (under 35 hours) compared with under 7% in Britain. (There were few 
differences here for women.) However some of the part-timers may have been looking for 
full-time jobs. (Source: Britain, 1971 Census Economic Activity table 23; U.S., as for 
table 15.2). 528  Richard Layard 
11.  Employment and  Training Report of  the President, 1978, pp. 242 and 18688. 
12.  C.P.S. analyses by D. Ellwood and M. Feldstein show that of  males under 20 out ot 
school and out of the labor force, only 37% say they would definitely like a job, and of these 
only 37% are not looking because they do not think they could find one. Of  the whole group 
(males under 20 out of school and out of labor force) 28% say they will not look for work in 
the next 12 months (or their intentions are so reported). 
13. See Freeman’s paper in this volume, table 5.6. 
14.  I would explain the fact that individual youth unemployment is negatively correlated 
with income by the same type of expression as used to  explain individual youth participation 
in the labor force. 
15. Not all differences found in cross-sectional data for individuals are found repeated in 
a comparison of  U.S. and Britain. 
(a) The hours of work of  full-time workers are not lower in the U.S. (1977): for men 43 
hoursinBritainand45in theU.S., andforwomen38hoursinBritainand40intheU.S.  (see 
Department of  Employment, New Earnings Survey, 1977, p.Al8-19  and Bureau of  Labor 
Statistics, Employment and Earnings, July 1978, vol. 25, no. 7, p.39). 
(b) Female participation is higher in Britain than the U.S. 
16.  R. Layard, D. Piachaud and M. Stewart, The Causes ofPoverty, Royal Commission 
on the Distribution of  Income and Wealth, Background Paper no. 5,  London, HMSO, 
1978, and S. J. Nickell,  “The Effect of  Unemployment  and Related Benefits  on the 
Duration of  Unemployment ,” Economic Journal, March 1979. 
17. M. Feldstein, “The Effect of Unemployment Insurance on Temporary Layoff Unem- 
ployment,” American Economic Review, December 1978. 
18. The previous comparison is complicated  by two factors. First, Feldstein’s figures 
include women but he also shows a figure of .54 for the subsample of (predominantly male) 
union members. Second, his figures are individual income replacement ratios and ours are 
family income replacement ratios. On average, women’s earnings account for under one- 
fifth of family income so the British individual income replacement ratios for all males could 
not be as low as the U.S. ratios for “privileged”  males. (Most international comparative 
statistics on unemployment relief fail to mention the British Supplementary Benefit system 
which determines the income maintenance levels of  50% of  the unemployed, compared 
with 30% whose income maintenance is determined by National Insurance). 
19. A youth in a family characterized by an altruistic head does not face the full cost of his 
actions. If  he decides his own labor force behavior, he may make choices which do not 
maximize family income. 
20.  She is unlikely to say this if  the youth is under 18, for if  the youth is under 18, the 
AFDC entitlement includes a child allowance only payable (for a nonstudent) if the child is 
working or  registered unemployed. This constitutes a strong pressure to participate (though 
not to take a job). But under a quarter of unemployed teenagers out of school are under 18. 
21.  1975 Survey of Income and Education analysis by R. Freeman. Data relate to 18-19 
year old males. 
22.  Seventy-five percent of men are covered. 
23.  Another approach is to look at  the shape of estimated experience-earning profiles. If 
male annual earnings are regressed on schooling,  experience and experience squared, 
earnings at the peak are 280% higher than starting earnings in Britain and 288% higher in 
the  U.S.  (G. Psacharopoulos  and R. Layard,  “Human Capital  and Earnings:  British 
Evidence  and a Critique,” Review of  Economic Studies,  3 (1979):485-508;  J. Mincer, 
Schooling,  Experience and Earnings, 1974.) 
24. 0.  Ashenfelter and R. Smith, “Compliance with the Minimum Wage Law,” Journal 
of  Political Economy 2 (1979):333-50. 
25.  Department of Employment, New Earnings Survey, 1977, table 126. For U.S., as in 
table 15.5. 529  Youth Unemployment in Britain and the United States 
26.  See, for example, J. Mincer, “Unemployment Effects of  Minimum Wages,” Journal 
of  Political Economy 4 (1976):S87-S104. 
27.  Formerly known as the Youth Employment Service, this is run by local education 
authorities and has primary responsibility for the placement of school leavers. Twenty-two 
percent of  a random sample of 3,000 16 to 19 year olds interviewed in November 1976 said 
they got  their  first job through  the Careers Service (Manpower Services Commission, 
Young People and Work, Manpower Studies no.  19781,1978). Even for those who have 
already worked, the Careers Service remains the main public employment agency up to the 
age of  18. Even though they are entitled to use the Employment Services Agency, only 20% 
of  the registered unemployed under 18 who had worked were registered with the E.S.A. 
(House of  Commons  Expenditure Committee:  Social Services and Employment  Sub- 
committee Enquiry into Employment  and Unemployment  in the New Unemployment 
Situation. Second Memorandum Submitted by the Department of Employment, 1978. par. 
27.) 
28. For a useful comparison of  placement services in Britain,  U.S., and some other 
countries,  see U.S.  Department of  Labor, Employment  and Training Administration, 
From Learning to Earning: A Transnational Comparison of  Transition Services, R  and D. 
Monograph 63 (abridged version of a report by Beatrice G. Reubens). 
29.  Department of  Employment, Gazette, regular statistics. Relate to number of school- 
leavers registered as unemployed. A “school-leaver” is anyone under 18 who has never had 
a full-time job. From January 1961 to January 1975 the number of  unemployed people 
under 18 who had not yet found a first job by January never rose above 10,OOO in any year. In 
January 1976 it was 38,000. 
30.  I am assuming unemployment always lasts a whole number of  weeks. 
31. Expressions (1) and (2) are of  course equivalent in a steady state since 
d=l  FdTd  = !=  (“. !=  cI) 
= (FJ, + F,(C* + C2) + F3(C1 + c, + C,) + . . . 
+C3(F3+.  . .)+.  . . 
= Cl(FI+ F2 + F3  + . . . ) + CZ(F2 -I  f73 + . . . ) 
= XC, N, 
since N,  = X  Fd 
m 
d=t 
32. This assumes no repeated spellsin  a year. If  a worker’s annual weeks are held to  I AH  I 
below their equilibrium level, the compensated supply price falls from W to V where 
dW 
dH 
W -  V=-  lAHl 
Hence 
The  procedure also ignores the existence of income and product taxes (which means that the 
cost of  unemployment is higher than we have measured it). 
33.  Since replacement ratios are higher in Britain than the US., E may also be higher. 
See R. Jackman and R. Layard, “The  Efficiency Case for Long-Run  Labour Market 
Policies,”  Economica 47 (1980):331-50. 
34.  See S. Salant, “Search Theory and Duration Data: A Theory of  Sorts,” Quarterly 
Journal of  Economics 91 (1977):3!%57. 
35. The U.S. duration figures are taken from Akerlof and Main since Clark and Sum- 
mers’s figures do not reflect short spells beginning and ending between CPS  interviews. (The 
Clark and Summers’s figures are 9.4 for 1974, and 11.3 for 1976, see K.  Clark and L. 530  Richard Layard 
Summers, “Labor Force Transitions and Unemployment ,” NBER., mimeo, April 1978). 
However, I rely on the Clark and Summers’s finding of  almost identical durations for men 
and women in assuming that Akerlof and Main’s figures for both sexes also apply to men. 
36.  Employment and Training Report of  the President, 1978, p. 275 and Department of 
Employment Gazette, May 1978, p. 577. It would be interesting to compare the distribution 
of establishments by their annual changes in employment, in order to see to  what extent the 
labor turnover reflects demand-side as opposed to supply-side forces. 
37.  There is some evidence that in the U.S. and Britain the number of  repeated spells is 
similar at all ages. For Britain the evidence comes from the Department of  Health and 
Social  Security Pilot  Study on New  Methods of  Collecting  Unemployment  Statistics, 
1971-72,  unpublished. (See also, S.  Owen, “Do the Faces in the Dole Queue Change?” 
University  College,  Cardiff,  mimeo,  summer  1978.) U.S.  data are special tabulations 
relating to nonstudents and show average numbers of  spells in 1971 of 1.83 for men aged 
16-19  and 1.72 for men aged 20-24. 
38.  In both countries, of  course, the inflow of youths into unemployment is much higher 
than of adults, though, perhaps interestingly, the difference in Britain seems rather less than 
the differential turnover rate. The percentage of  employees who have been with their 
current employer for less than 12 months is (April 1976) 
Under 18  18-20  21-24  25-29  30-39  40-49  50-59  All 
Males  57  21  20  14  10  6  4  11 
Females  60  25  21  16  15  9  5  16 
(New Earnings Survey) 
39.  This whole section is based on data generously supplied by Peter Makeham of the 
Department of  Employment from his forthcoming study of youth unemployment, summa- 
rized in Department of  Employment Gazette, August 1978. Full details of  the time-series 
sources are available in the Technical Annex to his article in the Department of  Employ- 
ment Gazette, August 1978, obtainable from the Department of  Employment. The follow- 
ing definition is important. Unemployment rates are measured in July but exclude school- 
leavers in order to avoid problems  to do with changes in school-leaving dates.  Adult 
students are also excluded. The cross-section data are based on the 1971 Census table 18, 
unemployed rates being measured by total out of employment as percentage of all economi- 
cally active. 
40.  The same has happened in France and Germany (see H.  Gallis, “Youth Unemploy- 
ment: A Statistical Analysis,”  EMP 47-1/WP  2, I.L.O. Oct. 1977). 
41.  Since W and UA  are small 
But in addition, since Wl  UA  is not far from unity 
with f’  >  0. 
42.  The estimate of 5% is based on a simple calculation in which all teenage workers are 
assumed to have left at the minimum age but to experience a 10% increase in earnings for 
each year of  work experience. An extra year of  schooling is also assumed to add 10% to 
wages. Hence in a steady state the initial teenage work force has five age groups earning 1, 
1.1,1.2,1.3, and 1.4 units respectively and the new teenage workforce has four age groups 
earning 1.1,1.2,1.3, and 1.4respectively. This gives a5%  rise in earnings, which is too high 
since only a half a cohort were forced to stay on. Unfortunately, no more subtle exercise is 
worthwhile since there is no fine breakdown of teenage wages by age, let alone by age and 
education. The best data are in the source to table 15.5. 531  Youth Unemployment in Britain and the United States 
43. Insofar as unemployment affected pay, I assume the relationship has a lag so that 
44. See for example Department of  Employment Gazette, April 1978, p. 427. 
45.  It might be better still to measure the fraction aged (15 + D)  to (19 + D)  where D  is 
46. If  there were no other factors of  production,  constant returns would require 
current pay is predetermined. 
unity from 1973 onwards and 0 before. 
diK  + diy = 0 
But, as we  are omitting nonmanual  workers  from  the  demand system  (for  lack  of 
information) there is no virtue in imposing this constraint. 
47. A more complete system would include equations for aln CidT, aln C/aln K and dln 
C/  dln Y but there are no measures of  these variables that do not require making very strong 
assumptions. 
48.  See H.  Binswanger, “A Cost Function Approach to the Measurement of Elasticities 
of  Factor  Demand and Elasticities of  Substitution,”  American Journal of  Agricultural 
Economics, May 1974. 
49. To reduce the autocorrelation  of  residuals, the system was estimated as follows: 
A;  =  gi  + Zdij(lnPj -  In Pn) + diK In  K + diT. T 
-  p(gi + Cdij(lnPj, - -  InP,,  -  1) + diK  1nK- 
+  d,T InT-  + pAi, - 
Here p is the autocorrelation coefficient in the equation 
ui = pui, -  + ei 
It  has to  be constrained to be the same for all i in order to ensure that the factor shares add 
up to unity. 
50.  Up to 1956 I have to assume part-time woman-hours to be proportional to full-time, 
and part-time hourly earnings to be proportional  to full-time. 
51.  J.  M. Anderson,  “Substitution  among Age Groups in  the U.S.  Labor Force,” 
Williams College, mimeo, December 1978; R.  Freeman, “The  Effect of  Demographic 
Factors  on Age-earnings  Profiles,”  Journal of  Human Resources, Fall 1979. For a full 
discussion of  these and other related studies, see D. Hamermesh and J. Grant, “Econ- 
ometric Studies of  Labor-Labor Substitution and their Implications for Policy,” Michigan 
State University, mimeo. 
52. The model reported  here includes no adjustment  mechanism.  But I have  also 
estimated the model with In Preplaced by .5 In P + .33 In P-  + .17 In P-2.  The estimated 
price elasticities were very similar. However, I am currently, with John Abowd and Stephen 
Nickell, estimating a fuller model which includes a fully specified adjustment mechanism 
and distinguishes between people and people-hours. 
53.  Department of  Employment, British Labour Statistics Year Book, 1976 table 119. 
COmmeIlt  Daniel S. Hamermesh 
Clearly, the high points of  Layard’s chapter are the simple comparisons 
of the outcomes in the youth labor markets of the U.S.  and Great Britain. 
He presents evidence corroborating the now familiar point that youth 
unemployment is relatively higher in the U.S.  He then goes on, though, 
Daniel S. Hamermesh is professor of  economics at Michigan State University,  and a 
research associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research. 532  Richard Layard 
to present new material bolstering this simple empirical fact. We learn, 
for example, that  spells of  unemployment  among American  youths, 
though shorter than those in the U.K., are longer relative to adult spells 
of  unemployment. Thus part of  the explanation of  the higher relative 
youth unemployment rate in the U.S. is the relatively greater length of 
spells experienced  by  young people.  He points out, too, using both 
cross-section and time-series data, that the relative youth unemployment 
rate in Britain rises as aggregate unemployment increases (or job vacancy 
rates decrease). Similarly, he shows convincingly that the demand for 
young workers is quite elastic. 
The presentation of  these facts alone more than justifies the chapter 
and makes it an important catalyst to our thinking about the nature of the 
labor market for youths. However, we should be careful attributing the 
causes Layard identifies to the outcomes he observes. There are two 
related areas where this is especially important. Layard stresses the role 
of demand forces far too much in his explanations, ignoring the induced 
effects on unemployment through discouraged worker and other supply 
phenomena. Simultaneously, and in part related, he underestimates the 
importance of the minimum wage’s effect on the youth labor market. Let 
us consider each of these in its turn. 
Layard’s calculation of  the relative welfare cost of  unemployment in 
the two countries (section 15.2) understates his case, because it assumes 
that supply elasticities are equal. (Indeed, the footnote even suggests that 
the elasticity is greater in the U.K.) This is hardly likely to be correct, for 
(1) we have observed, as Layard notes, much greater secular changes in 
the participation patterns of adult males in the U.S. than in the U.K.; (2) 
the role of  adult women, a group with a demonstrated high elasticity of 
supply, is greater in the U.S. labor force; and (3) the American youth 
labor force consists much more than its British counterpart of  students 
interested in part-time employment. For all these reasons E is likely to be 
higher here, implying that the welfare cost of unemployment in the U.S. 
is even lower compared to the U.K. than Layard suggests. 
This emphasis on demand underlies the rationale for the time-series 
equation (3) and the interpretation of the parameter estimates. There is 
no reason why relative youth unemployment must necessarily vary nega- 
tively with the business cycle. Indeed, if  the elasticity of  youth labor 
supply is sufficiently high relative to that of adults, the relative decline in 
youth employment in a downturn, as employers reduce the hiring of 
youths disproportionately, will be outweighed by a reduction in participa- 
tion among youths relative to adults. The net effect is unclear, but we 
should expect relative youth unemployment to be less countercyclical in 
the U.S. than in the U.K., given greater youth labor supply elasticities 
here. Thus the coefficient on adult male unemployment in a regression 
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The minimum wage affects the youth labor market through the supply 
as well as the demand side. Surely Mincer’s (1976) work stresses this, and 
the same is implied by  a Harris-Todaro (1970) model of  equlilibrium 
search unemployment. If  the elasticity of  supply of  young labor is suf- 
ficiently high, the effect of  the minimum wage is likely to be reflected 
mainly in changes in unemployment and labor-force participation, with 
relatively little effect on employment. This supply-side effect may help 
explain Layard’s observation that the duration of  unemployment is rel- 
atively high for American youths, reflecting, we can argue, added search 
unemployment in response to the potentially high rewards if  the youth 
can find a job paying the minimum wage. 
In the case of  some U.S. labor market policies, supply-side induce- 
ments can be beneficial, as they offset the bias of the income tax system 
against market work.’ This is not likely to be a valid justification of the 
minimum wage, for (1) induced labor-force entry reduces time available 
for investment  in schooling, and  (2) youths in  the U.S. can earn a 
substantial amount through part-time or summer work without incurring 
any income-tax liability or adding to that of their parents-there  is less of 
a problem with tax-induced biases against market work by youths. With- 
out any offsetting beneficial supply-side effect, and with the demand- 
induced reductions in employment noted by Layard, there is no efficiency 
-  or equity basis for arguing against a youth subminimum wage. 
To explore these ideas in the context of the labor market for youths in 
the United States, I will estimate a time-series equation modeled after 
Layard’s equation  (3). The logarithm of  male youth  unemployment 
compared to that of all males, UY/ UTOT,  is regressed on (1) the unem- 
ployment rate for men 35-44, in percent, a measure of  cyclical activity 
(vacancy data are not available for the U.S. for a sufficiently long period); 
(2) the log of  full-time earnings of  youths relative to all male workers 
(WYIWTOT);  (3) the log of the relative populations of  young and all 
males (POPYIPOPTOT);  and (4) the effective minimum wage, com- 
puted by interpolating and deflating the series in Welch (1978, p. 29).’ 
The regressions are on annual data, 1959-76,  and are done separately for 
all youths 16-24  and for out-of-school youths 14-24. 
The parameter estimates are presented in table C15.1. The importance 
of  supply behavior  in the youth labor  market is underscored by  the 
differences in the responses to adult male unemployment in the two 
equations. For all youths,  whose labor  supply is likely to be  highly 
sensitive to the business cycle, I find that higher unemployment lowers 
their relative unemployment rate, in contradiction to Layard’s findings 
for the U.K. However, when the sample is restricted to out-of-school 
youths, I observe the same positive relation  that Layard found. This 
suggests that the problem of youth unemployment cannot be analyzed as 
a totality. Instead, we should distinguish between students and young 534  Richard Layard 
Table C15.1  Estimates of Equations for Log  (UYIUTOT), Males, 1959-76" 
All youths  Out-of-school 
16-24  vouths 14-24 
Constant  .683  -  .115 
(2.74)  (-.lo) 
Unemployment rate, men  -  .051  .043 
35-44  (-5.11)  (1.36) 
Log (WYIWTOT)  ,117  ,142 
(.56)  (W 
Log (POPYIPOPTOT)  -  .028  .018 
(- .32)  (GO51 
Effective minimum wage  ,00222  .0053 1 
(100  = 1938-76  average)  (4.07)  (3.50) 
RZ  .92  .53 
DW  1.98  1.83 
"t-statistics  in parentheses. 
people not in school, and recognize that comparisons to the U.K. are 
most relevant for the latter group. 
The results on the minimum wage variable are in the expected direc- 
tion and dwarf the coefficients  on the relative wage variable, though these 
latter have the  expected signs. That this occurs suggests the importance of 
the induced disemployment and search effects, and indicates too that 
noncompliance with minimum wage regulations may not be important 
enough to mitigate the program's detrimental effects on the labor mar- 
ket. Not only is this effect significant-the  range of  the minimum wage 
variable during this period is large enough to induce a 46% change in the 
unemployment rate of  out-of-school youths and a 17% change for all 
youths. The rise in the minimum wage variable from 1959 to 1976, due 
mostly to extensions of coverage, is alone responsible for a 14% increase 
in  the relative unemployment rate of  out-of-school youths and a 6% 
increase in that of  all youths. Finally, that the effects are greater for 
out-of-school youths is consistent with the observation that in-school 
youths have a more elastic labor supply and will leave the labor force as 
the increases in the level and coverage of the minimum wage restrict job 
opportunities. 
Layard's translog cost function estimates of the elasticity of demand for 
youths are worthy of  comment, as there are a number of  reasons to 
suspect they are biased, most probably downward. The only possible 
reason for an upward bias is Layard's use of time-series data: one finds 
that cross-section translog estimates of  multifactor production or cost 
functions generally produce lower values of the substitution parameters 
than do time-series estimates (see Hamermesh and Grant 1979). How- 
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(1) because the capital stock is held constant, a rise in the wage rate of 
youths is constrained by Layard to have no effect on the capital stock. 
Assuming, as seems reasonable, and as is shown in three other studies, 
that youths and capital are substitutes, the gross elasticity presented by 
Layard is likely to be below the net elasticity that is relevant for p01icy.~ 
(2) Hamermesh and Grant (1979) have shown that estimates of  substitu- 
tion parameters based on cost functions are generally below those based 
on production functions specified over the same time period and factor 
inputs. Which is correct depends of  course on the factor markets under 
consideration, but there is good reason to expect that estimates of  pro- 
duction functions, which treat factor quantities are exogenous, will pro- 
duce better estimates than those of cost functions when the labor force is 
disaggregated by age and sex. This is especially likely to be true for data 
on the U.K., where supply elasticities are quite low and thus factor 
quantities still more likely to be exogenous than in the U.S.  In sum, these 
criticisms suggest that the elasticity of  demand for youths is higher than 
Layard’s estimate of  -  1.25 and is  probably  closer to the estimates 
obtained in recent studies using the translog production function for the 
U.S. This underscores the importance of  avoiding inducing wage rigidi- 
ties in the labor market for youths. 
Both one’s priors  and a comparison of  my  regression to Layard’s 
suggest that great care must be taken in using explanations of  British 
labor-market pathologies to explain those of  our labor market. Most 
important, effects on labor supply among youths are far more important 
here.  Aside from inducing substantial international differences in the 
cyclical responses of  relative unemployment, and in our views of  the 
seriousness of  the welfare losses from unemployment, they also imply 
that fairly low earnings replacement rates in American transfer programs 
can havg larger disincentive effects on effort than will foreign programs 
offering higher replacement. The international comparison of  outcomes 
is essential, but the causes of  those outcomes differ substantially. 
Notes 
1. In my 1979 study I have demonstrated how the unemployment insurance system can, 
by  reducing risk, induce increased labor force participation, and have shown that this 
entitlement  effect  increases employment and partly  offsets the  disincentive effect  UI 
produces on the duration of unemployment spells. 
2.  WY and WTOT are earnings of year-round full-time male workers, from Current 
Population Reports, P-60  Series, various issues; the data on POPY, POPTOT, W,  and 
UTOT  are from Employment and Training Report of the President, 1977; and the minimum 
wage variable  is computed from Welch (1978, p. 29) by deflating using changes in the 
average manufacturing wage rate between the years for which Welch presents data on this 
measure. This series is available on request from the author. 
3. Berndt and Wood (1977) discuss the distinction between gross and net elasticities and 
present conditions under which they will differ. 536  Richard Layard 
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Comment  Beatrice G. Reubens 
In keeping with the purpose of the conference which this volume records, 
Richard  Layard  discusses American youth  unemployment in  light of 
British experience. He also draws some policy implications for the U.S., 
but  not  for Britain. Although Layard  approaches some comparative 
issues with great depth and skill, on several subjects he deals only with 
Britain, thereby contributing new and valuable research and analysis, but 
omitting the necessary American data for comparison. On other issues, 
he ultiizes a limited selection from the body of American research. 
As a special contribution to a volume on American youth unemploy- 
ment, Layard’s chapter is interesting and useful. But as an independent 
effort at comparative analysis, it is flawed not only by the imbalances 
noted above and the usual limitations of two-case studies, but also by an 
overly restricted choice of phenomena and explanatory factors, question- 
able choices in the basic data, and problems in the methods and content 
of  the policy suggestions for the U.S. 
The four points of  comparison Layard selects as the main phenomena 
to be explained omit some important issues. Layard chooses intercountry 
differences in relative youth unemployment, that is, the youth to adult 
ratio rather than the level and trend in youth rates as the phenomenon. 
Within this framework, he does not discuss at least one relationship in 
Beatrice G. Reubens is senior research associate at Conservation of Human Resources, 
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Britain which not only differs from American experience, but which 
American  analysts usually reject  as inherently unlikely to occur.  As 
Layard’s figure 15.1 indicates, British male teenagers had lower unem- 
ployment rates that all males through the 1960s, a time when the British 
postwar baby boom generation entered the labor market and, as figure 
15.2 shows, hourly earnings of males under 21 rose rapidly in relation to 
those of adult males. A discussion of these relative phenomena in Britain 
and the contrast with the U.S., allowing for differences in data sources, 
would have dealt with an important comparative subject. 
At least two other significant subjects for comparative purposes are not 
treated because the emphasis on relative youth to adult unemployment is 
not supplemented by consideration of comparative youth unemployment 
in the two countries. In section 15.1.6 Layard refers to the relatively 
successful initial  absorption  into the labor market of  British school- 
leavers, but he does not present the relevant U.S. data, which show 
slower rates. Nor does he examine all of  the factors that explain the 
British experience, which is most assuredly not the consequence solely of 
the differential  placement  rates in the two countries of  such official 
sources as the Careers Service (Reubens 1977, ch. 7, 8, 9). 
The second undiscussed subject is touched on in appendix B where 
Layard presents information indicating that unemployed British youths, 
including those who have never worked before, are entitled to welfare 
payments from age 16 in their own right. Since some U.S. analysts are 
persuaded that American youths are deterred from participating in the 
labor force or from  holding jobs  because  of  less direct  and smaller 
transfer  payments  (some to the family rather than the individual), it 
would have been a prime interest to discover how the British youth 
benefits (running well over 30% of net weeky earnings for the age group) 
affect the desire to work. Layard’s treatment of  alternative income for 
unemployed youths entirely in relative age group terms neglects some of 
the issues which most closely affect U.S. policy decisions, especially 
because these tend to be made in terms of individual groups rather than as 
relationships between  age groups.  From many viewpoints, the direct 
comparison of  British and American youths is of  prime interest. 
Turning from the choice of issues to the choice of explanatory factors, 
Layard’s analytic framework of  equilibrium and disequilibrium factors is 
sufficiently broad and well defined, but the specific elements discussed 
under each of  these main readings is highly selective. Layard seems to 
have chosen single institutions as explanatory factors simply because the 
institution  is not present  in  the other country. Thus apprenticeship, 
income transfers, the legal minimum wage, and the Careers Service are 
discussed without consideration of all the other relevant institutions and 
circumstances that might affect outcomes. These single institutions carry 
too heavy a weight in the discussion and conclusion. 538  Richard Layard 
The treatment of the British Careers Service offers an example of some 
of the shortcomings of the entire chapter. In his summary, Layard states, 
without documentation, that in the U.S. the government “plays little 
more role in the placement of  youths than in the placement of  adults.” 
His discussion of Britain at that point, however, entirely concerns activi- 
ties for youths. In section 15.1.6 of the text he makes no mention of the 
U.S. at all, but asserts that in Britain “the state apparatus makes much 
more effort to find jobs for school leavers than for adults.” This statement 
is supported only by information on British youths (that 22% of a sample 
of school-leavers said in November 1976 that they obtained their first jobs 
through the Careers Service). However, the British adult employment 
service claimed a 23% placement rate in April-July 1977 (Employment 
Gazette June 1979, p. 560). Thus Layard’s claim about relative place- 
ments in Britain is not  documented or supported; no information is 
provided on the comparable situation in the U.S.;  nothing is cited to 
prove that placements in the U.S. were lower than British for either age 
group; and no rationale is given for according such importance to this 
factor, especially to the relative ratio of youth to adult placements. As a 
conclusion to this unsatisfactory empirical presentation, Layard admits 
that he cannot say how important this factor is nor can he estimate its 
influence. Nevertheless, in another unrelated section of the summary, he 
declares that “the British experience does suggest that a good case can be 
made for a Careers Service for youths.” He does not make clear whether 
he is recommending to the U.S. an organizational replica of the Careers 
Service, to which many objections might be raised, or whether he is 
simply urging better informational, guidance and job placement serivces 
for school-leavers in the U.S.,  an acceptable suggestion, but one requir- 
ing no comparative analysis and equally applicable to Britain. 
Some factors are omitted from the comparative discussion that might 
have been expected to appear. The narrowing of  British earnings dif- 
ferentials between youths and adults (figure 15.2) contrasts with the 
findings of  a widening of  differentials for  the U.S.  (Freeman  1979; 
Wachter 1977). The causes of  this difference would be of  high interest. 
Furthermore,  although  Layard  takes  account  of  the  demographic 
changes in Britain in order to explan time-series changes in the level and 
ratios of  British youth unemployment rates, he does not consider the 
influence on youth/adult unemployment rates of  the differential demo- 
graphic experience of Britain and the United States. In fact, the Amer- 
ican baby boom was more intense and prolonged than the British. The 
proportion of American 15-19  year olds as a share of the 15-64 year-old 
population was 4 percentage points higher than the corresponding mea- 
sure for Britain from the 1960s on; earlier the gap had been smaller. 
Moreover,  teenage full-time educational enrollments, which  remove 
young people from the labor market, grew at a much more rapid rate in 539  Youth Unemployment in Britain and the United States 
Britain than in the U.S. The growth of  British educational enrollments 
was so rapid that the absolute size of  the British teenage labor force 
actually declined from 1950 to 1975, but in the same period even the 
American nonenrolled teenage labor force grew and the enrolled teenage 
labor force grew enormously (Reubens, Harrisson, and Rupp 1981, ch. 2, 
3,4).  Some effects on youth unemployment rates might be expected from 
such differences. 
One of the persistent challenges to comparative research is the need for 
disaggregated data, the paucity of  such information in many countries, 
and the noncomparability  of  available categories.  Some of  Layard’s 
controversial explanations may  arise from inadequate disaggregation. 
This may be the reason  that Layard’s job-rationing hypothesis is not 
upheld  by  the Rees-Gray chapter in  this volume.  Another  result  of 
inadequate dissegregation appears in the discussion of  those who are 
neither in school nor in the labor force. Layard attributes this to general 
affluence and the indulgence of  American parents, implying that the 
dropouts are mainly middle class when in fact the category is dispropor- 
tionately composed of  poor and minority youths (Wachter 1980; Free- 
man 1980). Our study of youths who are out of  school and out of the labor 
force in the industrialized countries shows that in the countries with a 
large proportion of  youths in this category (namely, Italy, Canada and 
the United States) the chief common factor is persistently high youth 
unemployment rates (Reubens, Harrisson, and Rupp 1981). 
Some of  Layard’s choices in regard to basic data are debatable. He 
completely excludes from his U.S. data, although not necessarily from 
American studies he cites, the sizable American in-school labor force on 
the ground that Britain does not count this category in its census. While 
this is true, it also should be borne in mind that the category is compara- 
tively small in Britain, partly because of differences in educational enroll- 
ment rates. For example, in 1960, 68.7% of  teenage American  boys 
(15-19  years) were in school against 18.5% in Britain, a difference of over 
50 percentage points which has been falling over time but remains sub- 
stantial today. 
It is questionable to exclude the U.S. student labor force, given the 
long average weekly work hours of older students during the school year, 
the relatively light demands of U.S. educational institutions on the time 
of  young people, the reshaping of  the youth labor market to accommo- 
date the student labor force, and the competition for jobs with out-of- 
school teenagers. Moreover, the relative size, labor force participation 
rates, skill composition, and unemployment rates of  the American en- 
rolled and nonenrolled have varied considerably over time. Although 
current unemployment rates for enrolled and nonenrolled are similar, it 
has not always been the case, especially when statistics are separated by 
age and sex. Admittedly, it is unsatisfactory to count each in-school labor 540  Richard Layard 
force participant as a full unit regardless of  how few hours are worked, 
especially for cross-national comparisons. The adoption of  a system of 
full-time equivalents might meet this problem. It would have been prefer- 
able to use U.S. data for each enrollment status separately, adjusted if 
necessary, rather than to exclude them entirely, as Layard did. 
In focusing on teenagers, Layard has slighted comparisons for the 
20-24  year old group which is likely increasingly  to occupy the U.S. policy 
spotlight (Wachter, 1980; Winship 1979). Layard also excludes females 
from the analysis. Since this omission occurs frequently in cross-national 
studies, it may be timely to suggest that the use of adjusted and qualified 
data is preferable to exclusion of this significant part of  the youth labor 
force. One specific effect of  this omission is that Layard draws conclu- 
sions about income levels of the two societies in relation to participation 
rates based entirely on male rates and leaving out the offsetting influence 
of the faster-rising and higher U.S. female labor force participation rates. 
Layard draws three policy implications for the U.S., of which the one 
on the Careers Service has already been discussed. Another concerns the 
minimum wage. He concludes that “if there must be minimum wages, the 
case for a separate youth rate seems overwhelming.” As Layard himself 
suggests, his evidence for Britain, which has no legal minimum, and 
comparisons with U.S. age-wage  information do not in themselves lead to 
his conclusion. He finds the age-wage profiles of  youths in the two 
countries similar and does not find the expected truncation in the U.S. at 
the lower end as a result of the minimum wage. It may be that this subject 
cannot be decided by comparing countries which have and do not have a 
minimum wage law. In that case, should a conclusion be offered for U.S. 
policy  as if  it came from the comparative experience when in fact it 
appears to be mainly based on Layard’s acceptance of  an American 
analyst’s findings? 
The third conclusion for the U.S. is that “it is not obvious in the U.S. 
that there is any greater equity case for measures to relieve youth unem- 
ployment than adult unemployment .” His discussion is not entirely about 
equity, however. He states immediately afterward, and without docu- 
mentation, that there has been a “relative absence of measures to combat 
youth unemployment in the U.S. compared with Europe.” While it is 
difficult to obtain  precisely comparable  records,  it  is  likely that  the 
number of  youths on U.S. programs, relative to the youth population, 
and the amount spent per participant exceed the corresponding number 
and per participant expenditures in European countries (Anderson and 
Sawhill, eds. 1980, ch. 6, table 1; Reubens 1980, table 3). And there can 
be no doubt that American programs have been in effect for more years 
than European. 
But leaving aside these facts, the argumentation  by  which Layard 
reaches his conclusion for U.S. policy seems complex and questionable. 
Layard acknowledges two ways in which American youths carry greater 541  Youth Unemployment in Britain and the United States 
burdens of unemployment than adults compared to the British situation. 
First, Layard states in the summary that the share of  youth unemploy- 
ment in the total efficiency cost of  unemployment may be higher in the 
U.S. than in Britain. Second, in appendix B,  he states that income while 
unemployed as a percent of  income in full-time work is probably lower 
for youths relative to adults in the U.S.  than in Britain. These appear to 
be two strong grounds for U.S.  policy tofavor unemployed youths, on  the 
dubious assumption that this type of national policy would be drawn from 
such comparative experience. But Layard introduces a third element 
(section 15.2). Overall, income out of work (mainly from unemployment 
compensation) is said to be lower relative to income in work in the U.S. 
than in Britain  (unemployment insurance buttressed  by  means-tested 
Supplementary Benefits). Without discussing further the fine points of 
extended U.C. benefits in the U.S.,  which prolong it far beyond the 26 
weeks offered in Britain, and the differences and similarities between 
welfare and Supplementary Benefits, it can be accepted that a lower 
income replacement ratio in the U.S. than in Britain would fall more 
heavily on adults with family responsibilities than on youths. But does it 
follow from this that the only course is to abandon the concern about 
reducing U.S. youth unemployment absolutely and relative to the adult 
rate? While continuing to give the reduction of  youth unemployment a 
high priority, is it not possible to increase the adult income replacement 
ratio? Beyond the equity and efficiency issues, there are other reasons for 
a society to be concerned about high absolute or relative youth unem- 
ployment rates, especially if  particular subgroups of  youths with inten- 
sified employment problems are identified (American Assembly 1979). 
If  these comments have stressed the observed gaps or deficiencies in 
Layard’s paper, it is because one hopes that his analytical skills will soon 
again address a comparative subject, preferably on a multicountry basis. 
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